| Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization | ||||||
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Supreme Court of the United States |
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| Argued December 7–8, 1915 Decided December 20, 1915 |
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| Full case name | Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization | |||||
| Holding | ||||||
| Due process protections attach only to administrative activities in which a small number of people are concerned, who are exceptionally affected by the act, in each case upon individual grounds. | ||||||
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| Majority | Holmes | |||||
Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915), was a United States Supreme Court case which held that due process protections attach only to administrative activities in which a small number of people are concerned, who are exceptionally affected by the act, in each case upon individual grounds. By contrast, rule-making or quasi-legislative activities that affect a large number of people without regard to the facts of individual cases do not implicate due process protections. It is an important case in American administrative law.
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The State Board of Equalization of the state of Colorado and the Colorado Tax Commission ordered that the valuation of all taxable property in Denver be increased by forty percent. Plaintiff company brought suit alleging that it had been deprived of its due process protections because a tax had been levied against its property without it being afforded an opportunity to be heard, thereby unconstitutionally depriving it of property. The Colorado Supreme Court ordered that the suit be dismissed.
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the dismissal, ruling that no due process rights are implicated in a tax levied against a large number of people.
Are all property owners entitled to an opportunity to be heard prior to adoption of an administrative order that increases property taxes?
The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth amendment provides that the government may not deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property without notice and an opportunity to be heard. Where an agency rule will apply to a vast number of people, the Constitution does not require that each be given an opportunity to be heard directly for the purpose of arguing in favor of or against its adoption. In cases such as this, it would be impractical to allow all individuals affected to offer a direct voice in support of or in opposition to an order. Thus, the Constitution is satisfied by the fact that, as voters, the taxpayers involved exercise power, remote or direct, over those responsible for the order. Accordingly, the judgment of the state supreme court dismissing this suit must be affirmed.
The result of this case is opposite to that reached in Londoner v. City and County of Denver. However, the apparent conflict between the two cases is explained by the observation that Bi-Metallic involved so-called "legislative" facts whereas the Londoner case presented an issue that required evaluating "adjudicative" facts. "Legislative" facts primarily involve determinations of broad policies or principles of general application, e.g., whether every tract of land in a large city has been under-assessed for property tax purposes.
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